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Abstract
This research challenges prevailing popular ideas about the so-
called "informal sector" and questions the very significance of the
formal/informal classification. It also suggests an alternative analytical
framework which stresses the need to understand the connections
between a broad economic and political context and a set of micro socio-
economic arrangements involved in the work arena.
In the light of evidence drawn from a field research undertaken in
January 1988, this thesis provides insights into the dynamics of the cloth
trading activity in the Kinshasa Central Market. The purpose is to
understand how, and to what extent, Zairian economic growth,
industrial development, macro-economic policies, traditional and
modern society both shape and are shaped by the organization of work in
the marketplace. More specifically, what are the relationships among
traders, and between traders and other economic agents, that affect the
accumulation of wealth in the marketplace? And, in turn, what are
some of the implications of market trading arrangements for national
politics, economy, and society?
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1Introduction
This thesis attempts to give insights into the dynamics of African
marketplace activities by examining the organization of work in the
cloth quarter of the Kinshasa Central Market. In the light of evidence
drawn from observing women cloth traders, this study challenges
prevailing ideas about the so-called "informal sector"; it also suggests
an alternative framework of analysis which stresses the need to explore
connections and relationships involved in market trading.
My willingness to undertake such a research originated from
frustration with what I had read about and learned about the "informal
sector". Prevailing popular ideas tend to consider "informal" workers
either as a highly undifferentiated group, exploited and dominated for
the interest of capitalist accumulation (the neo-Marxist analysis), or as
"perfect competitors" responding to market mechanisms (the
neoclassical analysis).
My own observations of Zairian market women suggest a more
complex pattern. While trying to identify the social status of women
cloth traders, I found a highly differentiated group in which some
women remained poor, exploited, and marginalized while others were
successful in accumulating and indeed expanded and diversified their
activities. Success or failure seems to be the result of both, market and
non-market factors; unequal trading skills, personal financial
2resources, networks of relationships and connections with kin groups,
relatives, and relevant personalities are the basis for market traders'
differentiation. Traders' behavior includes both, individualism and
cooperation. Neither the neo-Marxist nor the neoclassical framework of
analysis holds; alternative ways of thinking and writing about
"informal" workers are imperative. The key point in the alternative
framework, as evidenced by recent studies, is to fully comprehend
relationships and connections. This study explores the connections
between the broad Zairian economic and political context and a set of
micro-socio-economic arrangements surrounding market trading:
"connections" meaning reciprocal influences or interplay, but not just
functional linkages. I am not defining market activities in opposition to
a more "formal" set of economic activities (as dualistic models tend to
do), nor am I presenting the functions that market trade exerts to
promote and facilitate the development of the "formal" economy. The
purpose is rather to understand how, and to what extent, Zairian
economic growth, industrial development, macro-economic policies,
and traditional and modern society both shape and are shaped by the
organization of work in the marketplace. More specifically, what are the
relationships among traders, and between traders and other economic
agents, that affect accumulation in the marketplace? What is it that
allows some market associations to remain while others disappear?
And, in turn, what are some of the implications of market trading
arrangements for national politics, economy, and society?
3The thesis is organized around two different parts. The first part
presents a critical review of some prevailing theories concerning the
definitions and functions of the so-called "informal sector"; it also points
out the merits of an alternative analytical framework used in recent
studies. In the light of the alternative framework, the remaining
chapters of the thesis (second part) explore the organization of the cloth-
trading activity in the Kinshasa Central Market in paying particular
attention to relationships among traders and to connections with the
broader Zairian economic, political, and social context.
4PART ONE
Methodology: Toward an Understanding of Work Relationships
The concept of the "informal sector" originated from the growing
importance of unregulated activities that generate output and
employment. The use of the concept directed attention to phenomena
previously ignored; it also led to a theoretical debate around the
definition, functions, and characteristics of "informal workers" and
"informal activities". I will present here a critical review of prevailing
theories concerning the definitions and functions of the "informal
sector" (chapter I), and examine the strengths of an alternative
framework of analysis (chapter 2).
Chapter I.
Theories-Debate-Case Study. Critical Review
1.1 "Informal Sector': Origin and Evolution of the Concept
The literature on the informal sector draws a distinction between
two economic sectors: one usually characterized by large, legal and
modern firms, and the other one by small, unregulated and backward
firms. This dualistic approach was initiated by divisions of economic
activities and employment into "traditional" and "modern" sectors. In
the early 1970s, the dualistic (i.e. two-sector) approach benefited from the
5presentation of Keith Hart's influential paper on urban employment in
Ghana (Keith Hart, 1973). The British anthropologist introduced a new
two-sector terminology, dividing the economy into "informal" (an
extension of the concept of "traditional") and "formal" (close to the
previously called "modern") sectors; he emphasized the significance of
self-employment and the degree of statistical under-recording of income
and employment generated in the "informal sector". The
formal/informal dualism was reified in the International Labor Office
World Employment Programme report on Kenya (ILO. 1972) and became
a central organizing concept in subsequent publications.
In September 1971, during a conference on "Urban
unemployment in Africa", held at the Institute of Development Studies
in Sussex, Keith Hart presented his work on the low income
neighborhood of Nima in Accra. He pointed out the "high degree of
informality in the income-generating activities of the sub-proletariat";
earning and spending in Accra seemed not to fit with the categories
used by economists. In Hart's view, "a variety of more or less desperate
and ingenious expedients ranging from petty capitalism to theft"
constituting the "informal sector" help urban sub-proletariat to meet
"the chronic imbalance between income from wage employment and
expenditure needs" (Hart, 1973, p.65).
Within a year, the concept was incorporated in revised form by the
International Labor Office to identify the "employment problem" in the
Kenyan underdeveloped economy. The International Labor Office
pointed out the weakness of official statistics which omits "a range of
wage earners and self-employed persons, male as well as female, in
6what we term 'the informal sector."' (ILO, 1972 page 5). It defined
"informal sector" activities as "a way of doing things, characterized by:
a) ease of entry;
b) reliance on indigenous resources;
c) family ownership of enterprises;
d) small scale of operation;
e) labor intensive and adapted technology;
f) skills acquired outside the formal school system; and
g) unregulated and competitive markets." (ILO, 1972, p 6)
After the International Labor Office's use of the term "informal
sector", the formal/informal dualistic model became a common way of
describing the structure of underdeveloped economies in the
terminology of economic planners and analysts.
The dualistic approach misled analysts to explore two distinct and
independent parts of the economy. Empirical evidence showed that
formal and informal sectors were actually closely linked. This led neo-
Marxist as well as neoclassical economists to shift away from a
preoccupation with characteristics of each pole of the economy to a study
of relations between both poles. They explore the existing "linkages"
between the formal and the informal sectors. However, the
characteristics and functions of informal activities differ for neo-
Marxist and neoclassical economists.
Informal sector firms, and more generally small-scale-
enterprises are more labor intensive and less capital intensive than
their larger counterparts. As Judith Tendler points out, it is precisely
7because small-scale-enterprises combine factors of production in the
"right" proportions that they are valuable analyzing for neo-classical
economists. What enable small-scale-enterprises to use capital and
labor in the "right" proportion is the ("right") price they face for these
factors of production: high price for capital, low price for labor. The
price for capital is higher than in large formal sector firms as it is not
artificially reduced by subsidized credit and overvalued exchange rates;
the price for labor is lower as workers do not benefit from labor
legislation and unions (Judith Tendler, forthcoming). However, in
many cases, the productivity of small-scale-enterprises remain low, this
is an issue of concern which initiates further studies.
The neoclassical model of small-scale-enterprises have been
translated into a more popular form which portrays the informal sector
as a highly competitive sector where "perfect competitors" with "profit
maximizing behavior" respond to "pure market mechanisms".
Neoclassical analysts seldom pay attention to social relationships or
personal contacts among workers in the "informal sector" and with the
more formal economy. In a case study on Bostwana Informal Sector
(Alexander, Gay, Mbere, Setimela, 1983) market trade is viewed as a
highly competitive market. Relationships among workers, connections
with relevant personalities (public officials, wholesalers, customers), as
well as other non-market forces influencing wages, prices, and
productivity level are underestimated.
The informal sector literature first defined this sector as
marginal, peripheral, di-linked to the formal sector of the economy. As
empirical evidence showed that formal and informal sectors were
8closely linked the theory evolved and pointed out the functional
relationships between the two sectors of the economy. Neo-Marxist
analysts view informal workers as an undifferentiated group, exploited
and dominated for the interest of capitalists' accumulation. The
function of the informal sector is seen as one of allowing high profits in
the "formal sector" by providing goods and services at very low prices
(Leys, 1975, pp 267-268). "The informal sector subsidies part of the costs
of formal capitalist enterprises in peripheral capitalist countries,
enabling them to reinforce comparatively low wages on their own labor"
(Portes, 1978, p.37). The logic of the existence of the informal activities
lies in lowering the cost of reproduction of the formal labor force (in
Bromley and Gerry, 1979; for example Birbeck's analysis of garbage
pickers in Cali pp. 161-183).
Neo-Marxist analysis of the informal sector arises from a concern
with poverty; it is while looking at poverty, rather than employment as
Keith Hart and the International Labor Office did, that they pay
attention to the informal sector. They examine the nature of poverty
through an analysis of the functions of "casual work" or "informal
sector work" in capitalist accumulation.
From an analysis of informal sector firms, neoclassical analysts
pointed out the problems formal firms face. Neo-Marxist analysts define
the informal sector as a need for capitalist accumulation. As Judith
Tendler says, neoclassical analysts view the informal sector as the
result of bad economic policies; they suggest that by reducing the cost of
entry in the formal sector of the economy, developing countries would
bring down the level of activities in the informal sector. For neo-Marxist
9analysts the "informal sector" is not the result of bad policies in the
"formal sector" of the economy but the inevitable product of capitalist
development (Judith Tendler, forthcoming). Both of these approaches
view the linkages between formal and informal sectors as functional
ones: the latter existing either because of bad policies or for the purpose
of increasing capitalist accumulation in the former. The reciprocal
influences, the interplay between different economic activities as well as
the nature of work and its potential change within the so-called
"informal sector" are underestimated.
1.2 The Unsound Formal/Informal Classification
What is it that restrain theories from fully comprehending work
arrangements in the so-called "informal sector"? Is there something
wrong, unclear, or inappropriate in the very concept of "informal
sector"? To draw a clear line between the formal and the informal
sector, analysts assume they know the internal organizational
characteristics of both sectors of the economy. What is part of the
"informal sector" is sensitive to how "informal sector" is defined; a
definition approach does not seem to be the right way to enter the
subject. Any definition inevitably involves a degree of arbitrariness since
it imposes a single dividing line on what is in fact a continuous
spectrum of changing conditions. Formal and informal sectors are
actually "in a continuously fluctuating state of interaction and that parts
of one sector may be dominated or even created by, parts of the other
sector" (Bromley 1978 pp. 1034-1035.). Empirical evidence shows that a
neat line distinguishing the informal from the formal sector of the
10
economy does not exist. Dualism does not satisfactorily handle the
complexities of Third-World urban economic life.
All classification schemes can be considered arbitrary, subjective,
inflexible, and/or narrowly define for a specific purpose (Harvey,1969 pp.
326-327; Johnston, 1968 pp. 575-589; Smith, 1965 pp. 539-548). The
formal/informal classification suffers from all of the problems that beset
any bipolar model; by dividing all economic activities into two broad
categories it is simple and sketchy. Moreover, it is inconsistent in that it
assumes that several different variables can be used to categorize a
given economic activity into the formal or informal sectors; yet no
multivariate analysis procedure is used in classifications (Bromley,
1978). The formal/informal dichotomy does not clearly set out the
articulation between the two sectors. Some activities end up being "non-
classifiable" as they possess characteristics of both, the formal and the
informal sectors. For instance, small scale owner operated
establishments that supply on contract to large formal sector firms or
registered market traders who sell illegally imported goods become
anomalies. The classification also tends to confuse neighborhood,
households, individuals and activities with enterprises, to view the
informal sector as an exclusively urban phenomenon, and to consider
"urban informal sector" and "urban poor" as synonymous (Bromley,
1978; Moser, 1978). The dualistic approach is not an adequate tool of
analysis; neither is it an appropriate approach for generating
development policies. Dualism leads to erroneous conclusions and
dangerous overgeneralizations which in turn suggest inappropriate
development policies. Bromley argues, this approach misleads policy
makers to apply packages of undifferentiated policies to the whole
11
informal sector; governments end up adopting "similar programmes
towards artisans making furniture, towards artisans illegally
manufacturing fireworks, towards sellers of basic foodstuffs, and
towards prostitutes or drug-peddlers" (Bromley, 1978). The informal
sector is actually diverse enough to necessitate a wide range of
differentiated policies.
Bromley argues that the weakness of the informal sector concept
could be remediable by greater clarity and rigor in the use of the
formal/informal terminology and by the development of appropriate
subdivisions within the two sectors. Lisa Peattie advocates in favor of a
more radical position. She argues that there is a gap between the
categories and conceptualizations of macro analysis and the
understanding of economic activities. Lisa Peattie acknowledges the
merits of the "informal sector" concept which did give standing to a
number of small enterprises previously ignored, but she suggests
banishing the expression "informal sector" which does not help for a
clear comprehension of the functioning of economic activities. "The
insistence of lumping diverse activities together and to separate them
from others, to which they are linked, is likely to make it harder for us to
carry our analysis to a useful conclusion (...) Instead of playing with
words like "informal sector" which try to bundle an untidy reality into
the seemly shape of an entity in macro analysis, let us rather learn how
society interact." (Lisa Peattie, 1987, p.857)
From here, where do we go? Once we have considered the
weakness of the dualistic formal/informal classification and eventually
reject the concept "informal sector", how do we deal with the analysis of
market trade types of arrangements?
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Chapter 11
An Altemative Framework of Analysis
11.1 Intimate Connections
The literature mentioned in the preceding chapter uses a rather
static framework of analysis; by focusing on functional relationships
between two sectors, supposed to be pre-defined, analysts underestimate
processes of change within each of the sectors. To the contrary, the
alternative approach to the analysis of social and economic mechanisms
is dynamic; it allows an understanding of patterns of change and
explores the connections between a set of micro socio-economic
arrangements and a specific macro environment with its historical,
social, economic, and political aspects. Recent theories and case studies
point out the need to explore how economic institutions interact (Lisa
Peattie, 1987) or how macro structures both influence and are influenced
by micro arrangements (Gillian Hart, 1985).
Researchers in favor of an alternative analytical framework
stress the need for crossing disciplinary boundaries. Sandbrook argues
that it is precisely the "ahistorical and apolitical thrust of the
neoclassical economic prescriptions [that] provides some grounds for
skepticism" (Sandbrook, 1986). What Peel admires in the work of the
economist Sara Berry is the way in which she has "thoroughly
assimilated those other discourses --social historical, anthropological,
geographical-- which bear on African development". (Peel, 1986). By
13
showing how social relations, among African peasants or among
Nigerian mechanics, have both influenced and been shaped by a specific
environment, Sara Berry presents accurate and comprehensive pictures
of the interplay between local and national, economic and social
contexts. Facing economic instability (an aspect of the "broad" economic
and political environment), she argues that African peasants seek to
diversify their options through higher mobility, monetary liquidity, and
investment on networks of relationships (among kin and communities
groups). These local strategies for coping with political or economic
instability facilitate trade, migration, short-term capital flows among
sectors and therefore reinforce and modify long-term processes of
agrarian change. According to her analysis, what some might call the
"African peasant resilience" reflects an increasing circulation of output
and resources, and the strengths of the networking process, but it does
not have much to do with the growth of output, the intensification of
productive capacity, or the resurgence of local self-sufficiency (Sara
Berry, forthcoming). Similarly, in her analysis of motor mechanics
workers in urban Nigeria (Sara Berry, 1985 pp.135-165) Sara Berry
shows how strategies of accumulation themselves may limit the growth
of informal enterprises; indeed, African entrepreneurs invest
considerable effort and resources to ensure or advance their status
within kin groups, they tend to divert investable surplus from more
productive activities. In both cases, Sara Berry shows how local socio-
economic arrangements derived from a specific macro-economic
context, and examines the feed-back effects of these local arrangements
on the overall process of development.
14
Hirschman's presents another valuable illustration of reciprocal
influences between micro and macro processes. He traces the shape of
economic development, including its social and political components to
the specific economic activities a country takes up. Hirschman argues
that staple crop tends to "imprint certain patterns of its own on whatever
environment happens to be around". He suggested that the role of
sugarcane cultivation in reinforcing socialism in Cuba today is similar
to the role of the same staple in post-Renaissance Europe where it
favored the expansion of slavery. This common reinforcing role is due to
the way work is organized in sugarcane cultivation which is itself
related to some peculiar characteristics of sugarcane cultivation: the
large incidence of unskilled labor, the seasonal nature of the demand for
labor and the need to keep the labor force together during the slack
season (Hirschman, 1981).
By exploring the nature and origin of relationships, personal
connections, and work arrangements the alternative methodology
allows analysts to "capture" patterns of change. Sara Berry offers clear
examples of techniques for pinpointing change: in her original study of
Yoruba cocoa farmers (S. Berry, 1985) she analyzes the uses of the
income generated in agriculture, and examines the implications of
farmers' expenditure patterns for the changing structure of economic
activity; she also paid attention to the occupations of the farmers'
children, and to the changing social relationships among migrant
farmers, their home communities, and their emigrants sons and
daughters.
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11. 2 The Strengths of the Alternative Framework of Analysis
The alternative analytical framework presented in the preceding
section has the merit of sheding light on policy debates. Although
analysts in favor of this alternative framework do not offer specific policy
prescriptions to elevate the standard of living of so-called "casual" or
"informal" workers, they suggest that the failure of previous policies is
related to a misunderstanding of intimate connections and linkages.
According to Lisa Peattie, "if we think about the world in terms of
a division between a 'formal' and an 'informal' sector we will be
glossing over the linkages which are critical for a working policy"
(L.Peattie, 1987, p 858). She argues that housing production by the
"informal sector" cannot expand without permissive regulation and
affordable prices for land and materials. Yet, those with a vested
interest in land and in building materials are politically powerful; as
they would not benefit from the development of informal housing
production, they are likely to hinder policies that would favor such an
expansion.
Bromley and Gerry point out that development policies aimed at
improving the living conditions of a particular "target group" (the urban
poor, the landless laborers, the informal workers...) often fail to bear
satisfactorily results; the positive effects of the policy "leak away" to, or
are "hijacked" by, another group of economic units because of specific
relations of appropriation. Referring to agrarian reforms, they recall the
fact that on numerous occasions, formerly landless agricultural
laborers have been forced to sell land acquired through agrarian reform,
in order to pay debts which have continued to accumulate as preexisting
16
relations of appropriation in the agrarian social structure have
remained unreformed. "It seems strange, they argue, that few
observers have made the important connections between linkages and
leakages" (Bromley and Gerry, 1979, p.307). Indeed, as these authors
suggest, without an understanding of the relationships between a
"target group" and other sections of the population, policies aimed at
benefitting a disadvantaged group will inevitably assist that group only
to a very limited extent. Bromley and Gerry stress the need for policy
makers to "throw off the yoke of dualism, discard target groups as the
rule-of-thumb basis for intervention, and at least take some account of
target relationships" (Bromley and Gerry, 1979, p.307).
Sara Berry indicates that policies based solely on orthodox
economics are not likely to drastically change development processes;
policy decision makers should pay attention to the existing social and
economic arrangements undertaken at the local level, and explore their
relations within the broader context in which they operate. For instance,
the ongoing strategies of accumulation in the African agrarian context,
require important resources to ensure or advance one's status within
kin groups and communities; they are likely to divert investable surplus
from more productive activities and this will hold with whatever
austerity or pricing policy. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing
surplus in the agricultural sector (by increasing the price of
agricultural products for example) may not have the expected positive
result (Sara Berry, forthcoming).
This section has shown how a comprehensive picture of the
realities of economic and social relations at the local level allows
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analysts to understand, and possibly to predict the shortcomings and
leakages of a development policy. Judith Tendler argues that there is a
need today for a more policy oriented type of research on the "informal
sector"; empirical work analyzing the conditions under which some
succeed in the "informal sector" and those under which others do poorly
may contribute toward such an end (Judith Tendler, forthcoming).
What follows is an analysis of the organization of the cloth trading
activity in the Kinshasa Central Market. Economic growth, industrial
development, gender, migration, ethnicity, and nationalism in
contemporary Zaire, as well as their nature in colonial and precolonial
Zaire are powerful forces in shaping the economic arrangements, social
connections, networks of relationships, and informal associations
developed by women cloth traders. In turn, these micro economic and
social mechanisms are --effective or potential-- forces in shaping the
overall Zairian development process. The following case study will
hopefully illustrate the significance of an understanding of
relationships surrounding market trading. Such an analysis sheds
light on the unexpected (local and national) impact of existing policies --
e.g. the import restrictions on cloth. It also suggests what the
shortcomings of so-called "desirable" policies might be --e.g. granting
formal credit to informal workers may not resolve the financing
problems of many petty traders.
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PART TWO
Realities at the Fringe of the Economy
This part attempts to provide insights into the dynamics of market
trading by examining socio-economic arrangements undertaken by
women cloth traders in the Kinshasa Central Market. In light of
evidence drawn from observing market cloth trading activity, the
following chapters challenge neoclassical and neo-Marxist
understanding of work in the "informal sector", the "underground
economy", or the "second economy".
Chapter 1ll.
The Setting: A Compelling Environment
This chapter explores relationships between the origin, nature
and expansion of market cloth trading arrangements and key aspects of
the Zairian context --national economic growth, industrial development,
macro-economic policies, traditional and modern society. Some of the
Zairian institutional aspects are major forces, others appear to be less
significant than I thought, in shaping the organization of market work.
19
111.1. The Ultimate Choice: The Informal Sector
Sluggish economicgrowth. Sluggish national economic growth,
rapid urbanization (especially in Kinshasa) and the resulting urban
unemployment and underemployment at low wages set up the
preconditions for the expansion of the informal sector. The second,
underground economy enables the mass of people to survive the current
economic crisis.
Zairian Gross National Product (GNP) grew from 1967 to 1974 at a
rate of 7% per year spurred by increasing coffee and copper prices; it
decreased thereafter. The severe deterioration of the economic situation
in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s is in many
ways the result of developments which took place in earlier years:
neglect of agricultural production, heavy external public borrowing,
deterioration of terms of trade, balance of payment crisis, huge
devaluation (of about 120% in 1987), and nationalization measures.
These indices of economic instability affect all businesses. Zairian
industrial sector (including manufacturing and agro-industry but
excluding mineral processing and construction) accounted for about 5%
of 1984 GNP and 10% of total employment in the modern sector. The 5%
share of industry in Zaire's GNP is now one of the lowest in Sub-
Saharan Africa. As late as ten years ago, this share was more than
twice as large and was comparable to the GNP industry share of such
countries as Kenya, Zambia, and Ghana. Between 1966 and 1974,
industrial output grew at an annual rate of about 6% (slightly below the
7% overall GNP growth rate). Since the beginning of the economic crisis
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in 1975, industrial output decreased without interruption (in 1983, it
stood at 31% below its 1975 level). The decline in industrial output started
with the collapse of copper prices in the aftermath of the first round of oil
price increases. The resulting shortage of foreign exchange, coupled
with the unfavorable investment climate (due to domestic authenticity
measures), caused a sharp decrease in industrial capacity utilization
and a deterioration of equipment (World Bank, 1986).
The rate of rural-urban migration in Zaire, as in most of the Sub-
Saharan countries, exceeds the rate of urban job creation; it greatly
surpasses the capacity of existing industry to absorb labor effectively.
The urban population more than doubled in the last ten years; while it
represented 28.7% of the total population in 1975, it grew to about 40% of
the total population in 1985 (Appendix 1). The total population grew at a
rate of 3.2% a year in the same period of time. The rural-urban
migration, the high rate of population growth along with the current
economic crisis lead to growing urban unemployment.
In the present political and economic environment Zairian
government considers the development of small-scale-enterprises as one
of its main priorities; influenced by the World Bank, Zairian economists
argue that small-scale-enterprises could help to absorb the increasingly
available labor force. Small-scale-enterprises could indeed resolve some
of the shortcomings of the large scale industrialization process of the
1970s for the following reasons: they are more labor intensive and less
dependent on imported inputs and technology than their larger
counterparts, they are also mainly owned, managed, and operated by
Zairian nationals while large and medium enterprises are mostly
owned by foreign interests -less than 1% of the staff of all small-scale-
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enterprises is foreign compared to 2.4% for larger firms (World Bank,
1986). Yet, the performance of small-scale-enterprises in Zaire remains
poor. Despite their concentration in industrial activities, the share of
formal small-scale-enterprises in total industrial output is low (9%); this
is partly due to the absence of small-scale-enterprise from the Zairian
most important industrial production --i.e. textile, petroleum, and
beverage (World Bank, 1986). The overall economic deterioration in Zaire
has seriously hampered the development of Zairian small-scale-
enterprises. Moreover, extremely difficult access to bank credit
(through the Zairian development Bank: the SOFIDE) and scarce
available financial resources limit their expansion. Poor management
performance, lack of training, and insufficient entrepreneurship
development are other impressive constraints.
The "Informal Sector". In urban areas, the "informal sector" is the
most important generator of employment. According to an International
Labor Office survey, in 1984 the Kinshasa active population included
about 230,000 informal workers and 204,000 formal workers. Some
analysts argue that the apparently slow rate of economic growth in Zaire
is in part a statistical artifact, the results of biases in the official
statistics which don't account for the growth (in terms of employment
and output generated) of the unregulated "informal sector" (MacGaffey,
1983).
So-called "informal" occupations include production workshops
(tailoring, brickmaking...), garages and repair shops, services (hotels,
restaurants, laundry, transport, photo studio), small artisan
establishments, and commerce ranging from international trading to
petty trading on street corners (ILO, 1984). Market trading is officially
regulated by the "Economic Affairs", the Market Administration.
Market traders register at the office of the "Economic Affairs", they need
to rent or buy a space (with or without a table depending on their trading
speciality) to participate in a market activity. Traders pay a 10 Zaires
(about a dime) ticket every working day and a 40 Zaires "Salongo" a week
for the cleanness of the marketplace. The "Economic Affairs" also fix
the maximum price at which goods can be sold. However, the Market
Administration does not regulate all of the traders' activities; traders
may be market traders (in the morning) and petty traders on street
corners (in the afternoon). Moreover, within the marketplace, some
aspects of their activities are unregulated --e.g. sub-renting of market
spaces or tables, trading of second hand garments-- while others are
illegal --e.g. trading of illegally imported goods.
Women traders. The International Labor Office estimated that
women account for 17% of the total employment in the Kinshasa
"informal sector" (ILO, 1984). Retail trade appears to be the most
widespread of women's economic activity in urban Zaire. Local officials
told me that 60 to 65% of market traders were women. Traditionally, in
addition from being involved in the agricultural work, African women
undertake most of the trading activities. In contemporary Zaire women
have few opportunities to work in the formal or modern sector of the
economy.
Like most other African women, Zairian women are clustered in
low status occupations and their access to training and promotion varies
from limited to non existent. Although most African nations have
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enacted laws that forbid discrimination on the basis of sex, only a few
women have been able to overcome the socio-economic constraints which
keep them illiterate, poorly paid or marginally self-employed. African
societies hold strong biases toward male superiority. A range of
exclusionary practices affect all women and ensure their subordination.
Zaire is no exception on this matter. The legal requirement of marital
permission to register a business or to obtain a loan, and the widespread
restrictions of women's rights in Zaire favor the exclusion of women
from the "formal" labor force. Legal restrictions are aggravated by
traditional and cultural constraints. Zairian legislation allow women to
act against their husbands' refusal to give them authorization to
contract; however, they seldom use this right. On the one hand, most of
them ignore their legal rights; on the other hand, traditional and
cultural forces restrain them from acting against their husbands.
Zairian society remains traditionally conservative, expecting women to
bear the major responsibility for growing the food and maintaining the
home and health. Legal constraints, cultural restrictions, and
insufficient education limit women's access to non-traditional (i.e.
modern sector) occupations. However, women need to have their own
source of income: most of the cloth traders I talked to were divorced or
had a husband who either did not earn enough or who neglected the
needs of his household. The social and legal limitations of their
prerogatives, the importances of the expectations on women's income
generating activities have a major role in shaping their activities outside
the household, they influence women's choice to engage in market
trading.
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Market cloth trading. The cloth quarter is the most prestigious area in
the marketplace. Although cloth traders constitute a highly
differentiated group, on average they are wealthier than most of the
other market traders; they are even wealthier than some secretaries,
employees in shopping centers, teachers, or nurses. The large majority
of the women cloth traders I talked to had a trading activity before
establishing in the marketplace. Some were cloth traders on street
corners, from house to house, or even in large societies; others
previously sold food and made enough benefits to "improve their status"
and sell cloth. Still some of them had a wage employment or the
qualification for such an employment; but, either because they could not
find a secure employment or just because they realized market trading
would be more profitable, a secretary, a nurse, a police-woman ended up
selling cloth in the marketplace. Indeed, low wages in the "formal"
sector of the economy led some working women to undertake a market
cloth trading activity (the case study number 3 in appendix 2 shows such
a case).
Cloth traders' wealth is due to their role in the domestic
distribution of cloth. Market traders sell pieces of cloth that are not
available in the registered shops; they are much better stocked than the
formal stores surrounding the marketplace. Market traders are well-
aware of the new arrival of pieces of cloth; they rush to the wholesaler
stores, buy most of the available merchandise and sell it in the
marketplace at slightly higher price than in shops. Personal ties with
wholesalers allow them to have exclusive rights over a particular
design.
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Cloth traders' status is also due to the local demand for the goods
they sell: in contemporary Zaire, women have no choice but to wear
"pagne" (African style printed cloth). In fact, in the beginning of the
1970s, through the Zairianization-Authenticity measures (government
sponsored takeover of most of the foreign owned businesses, mainly by
private Zairians) President Mobutu not only intended to drastically
change the ownership structure of the Zairian economy, but he also
attempted to "Zairianize" the population. Western first names were
forbidden and Zairian citizens were obliged to wear Zairian style clothes.
These measures established the obligation for Zairian women to wear
garments made of African printed cloth.
Wax-cloth, and particularly imported Wax-cloth are highly
prestigious goods. Anyone who has ever seen an African market on
postcard or on television, will have been struck by the wide variety of
colors in the costumes of women. She or he would find even more
striking the fact that most of these pieces of cloth come from Great
Britain or from Helmont in the South of the Netherlands where cotton
printing production (imitating Javanese batiks) begun in the 19th
century for delivery to Indonesia and later Africa. At the beginning of
the 20th century the method of applying the wax layer to the cloth by
means of engraved rollers appeared in Europe. This sophisticated
method of production and the resulting higher quality of Wax-cloth
enhanced the prestige of printed cloth. However, Wax-prints created in
this laborious way can never be the same in every respect: because of the
craftsmanship involved in the production process, every wax-print looks
different. Imperfections in the pattern, the fractures lines (crackles) and
the white spots which occur at random in the colors were not
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appreciated by the Javanese who saw this as a form of damage; Africans
however, regarded this "perfect imperfections" as an enlivening
element precisely because they gave each piece of cloth its unique
character. The Wax-cloth became a major product in Africa at the
beginning of the century.
In Africa, the local production of cloth was limited to printed
cloth of poor quality until the beginning of the 1970s when European
partners (Dutch, and British) transferred their know-how for the
production of Wax-prints in three African countries. In 1969 the
commercial production of Wax-prints started in Ghana; in 1970 an
entirely new wax printing factory was opened in Ivory Coast; and in 1971
the first wax-cloth prints came off the hand printing tables of C.P.A.
(Calicot Printed Association) in Zaire. However, as European textile
industries used both new machines to stabilize the colors and cotton of
superior quality the European product was better. Thus, African women
(both customers and traders) strongly criticized the quality of locally
produced Wax-cloth, and huge quantity of cloth has been imported
(essentially from Holland and Great Britain). In Zaire the situation
changed in 1987 when imports of Wax-cloth have been made illegal. In
fact, on October 29 1986, a state decision severely restricted the imports of
Wax-cloth. Mobutu's declaration in November 1986 defined the import
restriction as a mean to promote the local textile industry; these
restrictions are consistent with the overall ideological assertions of
Mobutu's regime, its anti-colonial nationalism characteristics. After
January 1st 1987, imported Wax-cloth could not (legally) enter the
country in large quality (more than two pieces per person entering the
country); the traders had up to six months to sell their remaining stock
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of imported Wax-cloth. However, as the quality of the locally produced
Wax-cloth remained poor, "Loterie-Dare-Dare" --the trade of illegally
imported Wax-cloth-- became an attractive animation in the
marketplace. Pictures and samples are shown in the marketplace while
the pieces of cloth are safely hidden around the marketplace.
The insufficient formal cloth distribution sector along with the
local demand for imported cloth (recently made illegal in Zaire) set up
the preconditions for the expansion of a cloth distribution network in the
marketplace which is partly regulated, partly unregulated, and partly
illegal.
111.2 In the Marketplace:
Women cloth traders in Kinshasa Central Market
The Kinshasa Central Market was created in the beginning of the
1970s. It is open from 8:30 AM (10 AM on Tuesdays and Sundays) to 3PM
seven days a week. Hundreds of men and women trade in the
marketplace and in surrounding areas. They sell basic food stuffs,
household equipments, children's clothes, shoes, second hand
garments, and African printed cloth. Most of the traders -sellers of
foodstuffs- sit on the floor, on a piece of cloth with their goods besides
them on one or two square meters of rented space; some sit behind wood
tables borrowed, rented or bought. Sellers are grouped by products.
Located behind the "Economic Affairs" office (the Market
Administration) and surrounded by shops, the cloth area is particularly
attractive. Colors, talks, laughs, and crowds create a pleasant
atmosphere. On small wood tables, women traders organize their piles
of colorful pieces of indigenously dyed cloth. The price fixed by the
"Economic Affairs", or "the first price" (from which bargaining begins)
is posted up. It represents the maximum authorized price; the
authorized beneficiary margin cannot exceed 20%. In reality, after
bargaining with their customers, traders reduce the price; they usually
make a positive margin of 5 to 10%.
The cloth area is the most prestigious quarter of the market place.
In Africa clothes are symbols: symbols of wealth, social status, taste,
political and religious beliefs in Africa. Those with effigies (e.g. the face
of the President Mobutu or the Pope) carry significant socio-political
implications. Colors and design speak their own language in the market
place. Some pieces of cloth have acquired their own names: "mon mari
est capable"(my husband is competent), "Dallas", "Ndakoya Nzambe"
(church) ... are names spontaneously invented by the local mammy
traders. They may refer to political event, songs, stories and tradition.
"Escalier ya Marechal" (the stairs of the Marshal) was created when the
President became a Marshal; "Esui Yo Wapi" (does it bother you?) is the
title of a song tailing the story of a divorced woman teasing her previous
husband as she was seduced by a much wealthier and nicer man;
"Mbanda Monument" (the rival) is the name given to the first wife, the
one who cannot be repudiated by her husband; a rare and expensive
piece of imported cloth was called "Oleli Oleli" (you can cry!) suggesting
the pride of the woman who could afford to buy it.
Women traders scared and fascinated me. They looked strong and
powerful, individualist and generous, attractive. Thinking back about
them I get a mixed impression of admiration and compassion:
struggling happiness and ingenious dynamism intrigued me. Despite
the severe economic crisis Zaire faces and the harassment by state
officials controlling receipts and prices in the marketplace, women cloth
traders remain optimistic: "on se debrouille!" ("one fends for one self!"),
bargaining and bribing are common aspects of their every day work. In
case of personal difficulties market traders help each others; they give
some financial assistance to traders affected by family mourning,
children diseases or divorce. The "emergency fund" is one of the
original informal cooperating system insuring a welfare function: when
a seller or a seller's close kinsman dies, colleagues in her sector
spontaneously contribute money for funeral cost and for the
maintenance of surviving family members. If a seller lost her husband
or one of her children, the cloth area close for an entire day.
While ethnic feeling is strong, the cloth trading sector is
ethnically heterogeneous; more surprising, traders from different
conflicting ethnic identity cooperate with one another in common
market association. This struck me as I knew how ethnic antagonism is
severe in Zairian society. The country is divided into seven regions:
Haut-Zaire, Equateur, Kivu, Bandundu, Bas-Zaire, Kassai-Oriental and
Kassai-Occidental. Most of Kinshasa population originates from one of
the Kassai or from the Bas-Zaire (the 2 regions that are geographically
closest to Kinshasa); these regions' population are extremely inimical
one to the other. Colonialism and post-colonial state regulations may
have some responsibility in initiating and promoting resentment and
antagonism among different ethnic groups (G. Gran, 1979). Zairian
current legislation tends not to favor one ethnic group at the detriment of
another. Mobutu's declarations strongly address tribalism and
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ethnicity issues; he advocates nationalism rather than tribalism.
However, ethnic resentments remain strong. The impact of ethnicity
and kinship is highly significant in social relationships and people from
conflicting ethnic origins usually don't work together. At the local level,
ethnic antagonism appears to be less significant than one would expect.
In the marketplace, while ethnicity plays a crucial role in friendship, it
does not prevent women from conflicting ethnic origins from working
together and cooperating with one another. This aspect of the traders
behavior led me to question the value of the market associations. Are
market associations valuable and profitable enough to hide ethnic
resentment? The following chapter (section IV.2) will shed some light on
the significance of market associations.
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Chapter IV.
Challenging the Theory and Understanding Trading Arrangements
I will present here aspects of the trading activity that challenge
the dependency and the neoclassical theories --i.e the high
differentiation among women cloth traders, the influence of non-market
factors in aggravating such a differentiation (IV.1). The following
section emphasizes on the organization and role of market associations
(IV.2).
IV.1 Contrasting Observations with Theories
Observing the cloth area in the Kinshasa Central Market first
generated surprises rather than understanding. Realities challenged
my previous expectations drawn from the literature. In fact,
neoclassical assumption of pure market mechanisms does not hold;
neither does the neo-Marxists' view of an uniformly poor "informal
sector" exploited and dominated for the interest of capitalist
accumulation. Women cloth traders constitute a highly differentiated
group within which it seems impossible to draw a common pattern of
behavior and opportunity. Their differentiation is the result of both
market and non market factors.
Some cloth traders are wealthy and successful, others poor and
"marginalized". They might be self-employed, employees or employers.
The elite of the cloth traders have found it possible or necessary to
diversify their activity. Besides their market cloth trading activity they
might have another market activity and/or another trading activity
outside the market-place. Some of them possess a small shop where they
sell African printed cloth, children's garments or household
equipments. Others concentrate a large amount of their time to the
illegal but highly profitable "Loterie dare dare". The poorest, on the
contrary, specialize on the hardest and least profitable activities. They
sell second hand garments --the Buaka Nzoto (which means "thrown
away from the body")-- and poor quality cloth. Indices such as the
following give a rough idea of the socio-economic status of a cloth trader:
- ownership, renting or borrowing of the table she works on,
- ownership or borrowing of the pieces of cloth she sells,
- number of pieces of cloth that she owns or borrows from her employer;
number of Wax-cloth-CPA (if any), number of regular printed CPA,
SOTEXKI, and SOLBENA (different brand of unequal quality),
- amount of money, if any, she gives regularly to a rotating credit
association,
- location of her table in the cloth area of the marketplace as traders of
Buaka Nzoto, of imported cloth, of locally produced cloth of poor quality,
and of CPA Wax-cloth, work in geographically distinct areas in the cloth
quarter.
While all of the informal sector's attributes set up by the
International Labor Office (see section I.1) appear to adequately define
the activity of some women cloth traders, none of them can be applied to
all of the women cloth traders I interviewed. Indeed, as the following
description shows, the realities of women cloth traders contrast sharply
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with the preconceived understanding of "informal workers" --easy entry
into the "informal sector", exclusive reliance on indigenous resources,
small scale of operation, low education acquired outside the formal
school system, competitive markets.
Entry in the marketplace is not easy for anyone willing to trade.
Opportunity to find a table and/or availability of the required initial
capital, is easy for some traders, difficult for others depending on both
traders' initial resources and other non-market factors such as their
relationships (based upon kin, ethnicity, marriage) with public officials
or with traders previously established in the cloth quarter of the
marketplace.
Space in the market is so limited, and the number of unemployed
or underemployed women willing to sell there so high that getting a
table is a strong barrier to entry. Still the most privileged of the cloth
traders own up to ten tables that they lend or rent to friends, relatives,
and employees. Those who succeeded in gaining an official allocation of
space pursued several strategies. One such strategy is for women to
keep checking with kin and friends in the hope of finding someone
willing to rent a table or about to leave the market; when a seller moves
away her neighbors or friends usually have candidates for the newly
available place. A woman with the good fortune to have personal official
connections may find the public authorities much more effective in
locating her a space in the market. Less fortunate traders may offer gift
(bribes) to the municipal clerk in charge of seating to encourage him in
his efforts on her behalf.
To open their businesses, most women cloth traders relied on
their husband or kin group financial resources. Those who bought a
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table, usually did it with the financial support of their husband or
relatives. "I'd like to help my wife to set up a market activity, said a
driver, but she needs at least 7 or 10 000 Zaires; I don't have the money, I
would like to have a brother or someone to help her... A bank would
never give a credit to a little citizen like me!"
To operate their activity traders usually rely on informal market
credit associations (the following section -section IV.2- will present these
associations in details); still, a few of them have access to bank credit.
The scale of operation of their activity varies tremendously depending on
their trading skills and again on non-market factors such as their
personal ties with wholesalers, customers, and managers of local textile
industry. Their opportunities for expansion is closely related to their
kin, ethnic or other type of connections with relevant personalities --
such as successful traders, wholesalers, customs and other public
officials. Their educational background range from the legally required
primary school to a bachelor degree in secretarial work (only 1 woman
out the 17 traders I interviewed was illiterate).
Access to merchandise is also based upon personal contacts and
connections. Women cloth traders acquire their goods through
individual ties with regular suppliers who might allow them credit
or/and the exclusivity of a design depending on their personal
relationships. While most of the traders have to pay cash the cloth they
buy at the wholesale stores, each of the wholesale shops has one, two,
sometimes three privileged traders (relatives or good friends) to whom
they allow credit.
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Access to illegally imported Dutch Wax-cloth is also linked to
personal contacts. Despite the import restriction large amount of Dutch
Wax-cloth do enter the country in various hidden ways:
- with the collaboration of airlines crew,
- hidden in authorities' or officials' luggages that don't go through
custom control,
- cut into two pieces, the pieces of cloth are then assumed to be parts of a
garment which importation is legally authorized,
- through other borders than Kinshasa, where custom controls are less
severe,
- and, most often, by corrupting customs officers. The level of the bribes
will then depend on the immediate financial needs of the officers, the
traders financial possibilities, their bargaining skills.
The characteristics of the cloth trading activity mentioned above
show how better personal contacts and connections are the basis for
market differentiation. These personal contacts related to ethnicity,
kinship or friendship are relevant influences to set up market activities,
they are also playing an important role in promoting these activities.
They allow them to travel, to import cloth illegally, to buy cloth, to find
secured and regular customers, to diversify their activities (...). The case
studies presented in appendix (Appendix 2) illustrate the impact of
personal contacts in market activities.
In her analysis on market women in Abidjan (Ivory-Coast),
Barbara Lewis argues that factors such as kinship, friendship, and
official connections are relevant to set up market activities but are
inoperative as a basis for group action. "In the market, women act
largely, although reluctantly, as individual entrepreneurs" as high
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competition in the marketplace prevents women from developing
associational ties that would advance their economic interest (Lewis,
1976, p. 135-156). It first seemed to me that cloth traders in Kinshasa
were also acting as individual entrepreneurs with no willingness and/or
ability to develop associational ties. "Here, they say, it's each for
herself!" Alike traders in Abidjan marketplace, women cloth traders in
Kinshasa don't support each others in case of administrative
difficulties; they also fail to organize themselves in associations that
would allow them to buy in bulk and thus benefit from larger discounts.
Previous bad experiences they had or heard about restrain them from
getting involved in such associations: they told me how traders have in
the past run away with the money of other traders instead of buying
cloth for them. However, market associations exist, and do in fact
facilitate the cloth trading activity. What is it that allows some
associations to remain while others disappear? What is it that causes
traders to be individualistic in some cases (Lewis,1976; Cordonnier,
1987) and cooperative in others? The following section examines more
specifically these informal market associations.
IV.2 Cooperation and Market Associations
Associational ties among women cloth traders in the Kinshasa
Central market appear to be strong; market traders allocate much of
their time and resources to the maintenance of informal market
associations. A striking aspect of the cloth traders' cooperation is the
persistence, and maybe the expansion, of Likelemba and Moziki-100kg:
Zairian illustrations of rotating credit associations (the Likelemba
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involves small amounts of money while the Moziki-100kg involves
millions of Zaires). While these type of associations tend to disappear in
Lome and Abidjan Central Markets (Lewis, 1976; Cordonnier, 1987),
they remain significant among market cloth traders in Kinshasa. I will
examine here some justifications for the existence and development of
Likelemba and Moziki-100kg in the Kinshasa Central Market. It seems
to me that while the allocation of credit and the opportunity to save are
indeed important aspects of the credit associations, other benefits
involved in such associations make them particularly valuable for
women cloth traders in the Kinshasa Central Market. Likelemba and
Moziki-100kg constitute strong network of relationships among traders
which allow them to facilitate the illegal but highly profitable "Loterie
Dare Dare" (the trade of illegally imported Wax-cloth).
Rotating Credit Associations. The performance and nature of
Likelemba and Moziki-100kg in the Kinshasa Central Market seem to be
in contradiction with common sense expectation. On the one hand,
despite the strong ethnic antagonism in Zaire (section 111.2), traders
from extremely inimical ethnic origins do cooperate in common credit
associations. On the other hand, the high devaluation of the Zairian
currency (120% in 1987) leads to a rapid decline in the purchasing power
of the money. This tends to decrease the propensity to save and traders
told me they find more "rational" to buy a new cloth immediately after
selling one. Then, why do cloth traders pay so much effort to maintain
their rotating credit associations? What is it that makes these
associations so valuable? What are the underlying incentives to
perpetuate this type of association?
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A rotating credit associations is based on an informal agreement
among a group of persons to make regular contributions to a fund which
becomes the property of each contributor in rotation. By joining such a
group, each member assumes an obligation to save a certain amount of
cash over a period of time: cash that she would otherwise dissipate.
Indeed, saving is extremely difficult for women traders; they told me
how the extended family and the strong tradition of cooperation and
reciprocity place enormous pressure on anyone with cash on hand to aid
a kinsman or co-ethnic. Participating in a rotating credit association
ensures them the opportunity of disposing of a large sum of money
whether to make a major personal purchase, to meet a high priority
family obligation (paying a child school fees), or --the most common case
among my informants-- to expand her commerce by making a large
capital investment. Women cloth traders in the Kinshasa Central
Market usually use the credit allocated by the credit association to
expand their market activities --to buy a table in the marketplace or
pieces of cloth of better quality.
Rotating credit associations are self-help banking arrangements
that involve no fee or extra cost; however the order in which members
receive the fund is a source of unequal advantage. This advantage is
financed by those at the cycle's end for whom the system works in a
manner little better than simply storing their savings under a mattress
would (they just avoid the risk of wasting the money). Also it is possible
that the group will break up before the cycle is completed: thus,
members whose turn come later in the rotation both provide cost free
loans for the others and risk losing their savings (Lewis, 1976). These
tensions and uncertainties have caused many market women in Africa
to become disenchanted with this mode of saving; rotating credit
associations among women traders tend to disappear in Lome and
Abidjan Central Markets (Lewis, 1976; Cordonnier, 1987).
The necessity and the willingness to save are so high that traders
in Abidjan and Lome pay an "ambulatory banker" who could help them
to save (Lewis, 1986; Cordonnier, 1987). Through the "ambulatory
banking system" or the "Nubuaka Ka Cartes" (system of cards) women
traders "contract" with someone to make regular deposits that they
subsequently receive as a lump sum. This system does not permit
individual traders to profiteer at their peers' expense, but it also reduce
their material benefits. Each participating seller has a small card,
marked off like a month's calendar, on which her "banker" writes her
name and the amount she has agreed to deposit regularly for that
month. At the end of each market day or week, the bankers pass
through the market to collect deposits. At the end of the month each
participant gets an amount equal to the sum of her deposits minus the
banker's fee (approximately equal to one or two days' deposit). Like the
rotating credit associations, the ambulatory banker system compels
members to save on a regular basis; but unlike the credit rotating
associations, this system results in the loss of a small part of each
seller's saving in fees. It seems surprising that traders agree on paying
the banker's fee; however the inability to keep cash on hand (as
mentioned above), the necessity to save to expand one's activity, and the
absence of other access to credit explain this behavior.
Women cloth traders in Kinshasa Central Market find the
ambulatory bankers poorly reliable; moreover, this system does not
promote advantageous ties as the Likelemba and Moziki-100kg do.
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Indeed, in addition from generating saving, rotating credit associations
constitute strong networks of relationships that Zairian cloth traders
use for various purposes (see appendix 3 for an example of the
functioning of a Likelemba). Likelemba and Moziki-100kg may serve a
welfare function in case of personal difficulties. Traders may also take
advantage of their co-participation in a Likelemba or a Moziki-100kg to
trade illegally imported cloth.
Loterie Dare Dare. The trade of illegally imported cloth is one of the
traders' most profitable activity. Imported pieces of cloth are sold at
extremely high prices: from 13000 Zaires (about $90) to 20000 Zaires
($140) depending on the color, the design, and the client-trader
relationship. Similar locally produced Wax-cloth are sold at about 8000
Zaires ($50), the prices of other kind of locally produced cloth range from
1500 to 5000 Zaires ($10.5 to $35).
While market women usually fail to create buying associations,
they do cooperate with one another to buy imported cloth. A group of
cloth traders --usually co-participants in a Moziki or Moziki-100kg--
collect a certain amount of money (each of them does not need to give the
same amount of money); they exchange their Zaires-savings in Francs-
CFA (as Zairian money is not exchangeable in Belgium) at " le beach" at
the parallel exchange rate. One of them is sent to Brussels to do the
purchase. Connections in Brussels (family, friends, relatives of other
traders part of the associations...) allow them to spend a few days in
Europe at the least possible expense. Back to Kinshasa traders have to
bargain with custom officials. Cloth traders agree that bribes are often
- --- -----
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expensive, but not excessive as compared with the expected benefits;
moreover, they think that "it is usually quite easier for a woman than for
a man to "lower" the required taxes or the fine". The most fortunate of
the traders (those with best connections with public officials) have
someone waiting for them at the airport and do not need to bear the
custom duties control at all. Wives of important officials find it
particularly easy to enter the country without paying any taxes on
imported goods.
Selling illegally imported cloth in the marketplace is very risky.
Traders multiply the number of intermediaries --usually co-participants
in a Likelemba-- between the importer and the actual seller. In doing so
importers minimize the risk involved in the "Loterie-Dare-Dare" by
spreading it over. For some traders who never sold imported cloth, this
opens an opportunity to have access to Dutch Wax-cloth and to make
substantial profit. The existing network of information and
relationships of the Likelemba facilitate the illegal trading of Dutch
Wax-cloth (see appendix 3).
The import restrictions drastically changed the organization of
the market cloth trading activity. The overall number of cloth traders
decreased (from the traders point of view, 5 to 15% of them left the
market place). The import restriction affect both the traders of locally
produced cloth and the traders of imported Wax-cloth.
A few weeks after the implementation of the policy, in the area
where cloth traders used to sell imported Wax-cloth, some of the market
tables were destroyed and others were stolen. Richer traders argue that
the damage was caused by the traders of locally produced cloth who
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ended up being adversely affected by the policy as both groups were
thrown into direct competition. Indeed, wealthy traders used to
specialize their activity in the trading of imported Wax-cloth; they did
not compete with the less fortunate traders who could only afford to sell
locally produced cloth. Since June 1987, all cloth traders officially sell
locally produced cloth in the Kinshasa Central Market and traders who
previously sold Dutch Wax-cloth become strong competitors with the
other traders.
While the import restriction was supposed to stimulate the local
production of cloth, it actually increased the propensity to import
illegally. Market cloth traders have all been strongly affected by the
policy. On the one hand, wealthy and powerful traders with good official
connections continue to import Wax-cloth and sell them at increasing
prices. Some of them left the marketplace but remain important actors
in the so-called "Loterie-Dare-Dare": they hide cloth around the
marketplace, travel and import cloth for other traders, or find
customers. On the other hand, the traders who never sold imported
cloth face new and strong competitors in the marketplace. Some were
pushed completely out of their market activities or at least out of cloth
trading; still others, with the good fortune to have personal contacts with
importers or wealthy traders --through their participation in a
Likelemba-- found new opportunity to sell imported Wax-cloth.
For all of the reasons mentioned above traders like to cooperate
with one another in a rotating credit association. If they do not
participate in such an association, it is either because of previous bad
experience (1 woman out of 17 cloth-traders I interviewed lost her
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savings because her Likelemba broke up because the end of the rotating
cycle) or because of financial resources. Rich traders do not need these
rotating credit associations, poor traders cannot afford to participate in
them. In reality, the poorest of the cloth traders are the only ones who do
not benefit from the advantages of market associations. Indeed, wealthy
cloth traders participate in similar associations (simple Moziki) which
usually do not generate savings; they get together once or twice a month
and talk about their trading activity. The non-saving Moziki are used to
"keep contacts and favour relationships" among the richer of the cloth
traders. Rich traders consider the non-saving Moziki very helpful (see
case study number 1 in appendix 2); some of the participants of the
Moziki are members of the "Association des Femmes Commercantes
Zairoises" (the AFECOZA is the official association of the Zairian
women traders created in 1985) and have close personal and
professional contacts with the political elite.
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Conclusion
Women cloth traders in the Kinshasa Central Market can be
classified as formal workers with respect to some aspects of their activity
and as informal workers with respect to others. Although market
trading is officially regulated by the Market Administration, however
some of the market activities --such as sub-renting of market tables-- are
unregulated while others --such as trade of illegally imported cloth-- are
illegal. This shows the weakness of the dualistic --formal/informal--
framework of analysis. By moving beyond the formal/informal
dichotomy, this study suggests more appropriate ways of grasping the
realities of market trading. What I find worth analyzing is, on the one
hand the influence of a specific macro social and economic context in
shaping the organization of work in the marketplace, and on the other
hand, the implications of micro socio-economic trading arrangements
for the national development process.
The nature and complexity of relationships surrounding market
cloth trading in Kinshasa are closely related to aspects of the broader
Zairian context --i.e. national economic growth, rural-urban migration,
industrial development, existing policies, modern and traditional
society. Relationships among traders through informal market
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associations as well as relationships between traders and wholesalers,
customers, and public officials are crucial elements influencing market
traders' accumulation; they are the basis for market traders'
differentiation. These socio-economic arrangements provide a non-
bureaucratic basis for the setting up of market activity, the required
initial and working capital, and a cushion against family and business
disasters. Access to credit, merchandise, social protection, are all based
upon one's ability to take advantage of personal contacts. The existence
and proliferation of these informal networks of relationships have much
to do with the volatile nature of the national economy and the
unwillingness of the state to underwrite a portion of the cost of social
and economic protection.
In turn, so-called "informal" activities play an important role in
the overall development process; market women are powerful agents of
development. Providing both locally produced and illegally imported
cloth, they are central to the local distribution of cloth. To the extent that
they have created an effective marketing system for illegally imported
cloth, women cloth traders are helping to undermine a central pillar of
policy. Their response to import restrictions shows their willingness
and ability to cope with economic and political unexpected change. The
implications are far reaching. At the micro level, the import restrictions
"deregulated" the organization of work in the marketplace and
aggravated the differentiation among traders --those without the good
fortune to have personal contact with public officials, wholesalers, or
powerful traders being the most adversely affected. At the macro level,
the local strategies for importing and selling Dutch Wax-cloth illegally
prevent the import restrictions from having the expected positive impact
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on the domestic textile industry. As long as locally produced Wax-cloth
is of poor quality, illegal import of Dutch Wax-cloth will remain.
Market associations represent strong networks of relationships
and information which benefit from the import restrictions: because
these associations facilitate the highly profitable "Loterie-Dare-Dare"
(the market trading of illegally imported cloth) traders tend to invest
even more time and money in the functioning of informal market
associations and in the maintenance of their personal contacts with
influential personalities. Informal associations in the Kinshasa Central
Market are highly valuable; they are valuable enough to hide the strong
ethnic antagonism which remains in Zairian society. The role
Likelemba and Moziki-100kg play in the so-called "Loterie-Dare-Dare"
partly explain why market credit associations seem to expand in
Kinshasa while they tend to disappear in other African marketplaces.
This study also shows how a comprehensive understanding of
social and economic arrangements may help analysts to predict some of
the shortcomings of a development policy. Policies aimed at improving
the infrastructure of the market place, at reducing the rate of inflation of
the economy and at stabilizing the value of the national currency could
benefit all market traders (all businesses indeed). However other more
specific types of policy will affect traders in a differentiated way, the
poorest --those without significant connection--being usually the least
positively affected. As many commentators argue (World Bank, IMF,
Zairian economists), there might be a need for the establishment of new
type of saving institutions and financial intermediaries in Zaire.
However, if they are to alleviate poverty, such institutions should not
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only mobilize domestic savings but, more important, they should
channel these financial resources to the poorest "informal workers",
those who are totally excluded from both access to bank credit and
participation in market credit associations. Opening bank credit to
women traders is likely to benefit only the traders' elites, those with
personal contacts with bankers and public officials and/or those who
already benefit from large informal credit allocation. Market traders,
and more specifically the Kinshasa market cloth traders constitute an
heterogeneous group of people for whom packages of undifferentiated
policy prescriptions cannot be successfully applied.
The limitation of the conclusions drawn here are a result of the
small amount of evidence presented; what I have pointed out rises
questions for further investigation. One possible way to follow up this
research would be to analyze more specifically the nature and role of
Likelemba and Moziki. What is their (actual or potential) political force?
To what extent do they constitute a welfare system? Do they promote or
hamper traders accumulation? How do these associations benefit from
the import restrictions? Are they more numerous? Do women traders
meet more regularly? Do they invest more financial resources in these
networks of relationships? It could also be interesting to compare
women's trading associations with men's. Are men's trading
associations as powerful as women's? What are their functions? Is the
welfare function an exclusively female association characteristic? What
kind of associations (if any) include both men and women traders?
48
Another way to deepen this research would be to trace further the
various impacts of the import restrictions. At the micro level, it would be
worth while analyzing the differentiated impact of the policy on the
traders who never sold imported cloth, on those who were specialized in
this trade. What happened to the traders who left the market after the
import restrictions? At the macro level, further research could provide
insights into the effects of the import restrictions on the local cloth
industry, on the price of locally produced cloth, on the local consumption
of Dutch Wax-cloth.
This study has been unable to define the specific role ethnicity and
gender play in market trading. To what extent are market trading, cloth
trading, and women trading related to ethnic identity? Three of the
Zairian regions, Bas-Zaire, Equateur, and Bandundu are matriarchal;
the Kassai (both oriental and occidental) are patriarchal; Kivu and
Haut-Zaire are partly matriarchal, partly patriarchal. What is the
influence of such rules in the activity of women traders in Kinshasa?
Does the success of some cloth traders lead to a redefinition of the intra-
household relationships? Does it increase the bargaining power of
woman vis-a-vis man within the household?
This study attempted to shed some light on the basic trading
arrangements that are critical for understanding the organization of
work in the marketplace. Realities of women cloth traders in the
Kinshasa Central Market defied the formal/informal categorization and
revealed meaningful and powerful relationships among traders and
between traders and other economic agents.
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Appendix 1
POPULATION (in millions)
1938
10.554
1960
14.444
1 975
22.582
1980
26.337 30.982
URBAN / RURAL POPULATION (in millions)
YEARS 1975 1980 1985
TOTAL population 22.582 26.337 30.982
URBAN population 6.477 9.010 12.238
% of total population 28.7 34.2 39.5
RURAL population 16.106 17.367 18.744
% of total population 71.3 65.8 60.5
Sources: Republique du Zaire, Departement du Plan: "Perspectives demographiques
regionales 1975-1985" pp 18-19.
Vanra 1 Q-.q A 1 W41 1 -9 7.; 1C.MYears
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Appendix 2
Case Study #1.
Mama Rosi. From petty trader to wealthy bourgeois
It is hard to believe "Mama Rosi" was once a petty trader in the
marketplace. I met her at the cloth wholesalers on January the second;
she was talking with one of the Belgian managers about the New Year's
Eve Party they all had at the famous Hotel Intercontinental. "Mama
Rosi" looks very wealthy, she wears colorful imported cloth, high heels,
jewels. We set up an appointment for the following Monday in her store:
"it is easy to find the place, it is in front of the marketplace cloth quarter.
My car, a white Mercedes Benz, will be parked in front of the entrance."
She could have added that anyone in the area knows where "Madame"-
an honorific appellation in a country where the Zairianization measures
obliged Zairian people to be called "Citizen"- works.
Mama Rosi was obviously happy to receive me in her store; she
kissed me warmly, introduced me to her 9 employees (driver, door
keepers, accounting person, and sellers), and took me to her office on the
top of the shop. The office is pleasant, with a large window which allows
her to see what is going on in the stall. Two pictures make up the
decoration; one of them shows her holding the Zairian flag, during the
ceremony of her admission to the AFECOZA (Association des Femmes
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Commercantes Zairoises), in the other one President Mobutu is
congratulating her on this occasion.
She migrated to Kinshasa with her husband and children in
1969, because of the rebellion taking place in their original village, Kivu.
Mama Rosi began work soon after their arrival in Kinshasa; she first
helped her husband in his business activities, he had a bar and was a
travelling photographer and trader (in cloth and garments). Today, her
husband works in a wood industry, their four children are all studying
in Europe, and she thinks she should send one of them to the States:
"I've never been to the United States, but I watch Dallas regularly; it
teaches me a lot, about how to succeed in business, how to succeed in
life! Do you see Dallas?"
At the beginning of the 1970s the Kinshasa Marketplace opened
and Mama Rosi immediately bought a table in the cloth quarter. She
was one of those fortunate traders with relevant connections; she
personally knew regional officer who was a friend of the family in Kivu.
He helped her to get a table and the official permission to work in the
marketplace. She specialized her activity in imported cloth, again she
was particularly fortunate as her brother, favoured by the same official
connections (the regional officer from Kivu), became the manager of a
well-known store. He had connections in Brussels and large official
import quotas; thus, access to imported cloth has been easier for Mama
Rosi than for most of the other traders. She succeeded in accumulating
and chose to expand and diversify her activity; in addition to her cloth
store she first sold garments for children. Today, she sells household
equipment imported from Europe and intends to open another store. In
doing so she protects herself from unexpected policies such as the recent
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import restrictions: "I don't need to take the risk of selling imported
Wax-cloth, my other activities work very well." She sells cloth to market
traders who pay cash. Actually one of her employee told me that Mama
Rosi give credit to one of her regular traders, her cousin, to whom she
give cloth on a sale or return basis. This trader is also the only one for
whom Mama Rosi saves some particular designs that none of the other
traders have access to.
Mama Rosi finds her membership at the AFECOZA very useful;
obviously good connections with public officials facilitate the
"bargaining" with custom officials. However she would not like to be the
president of the association, it requires a lot of time and would not allow
her to develop her own business activities. Mama Rosi believes that
illegal imports are generally easier, "less expensive" for women than for
men, "custom officials are more demanding with men, they also know
that a woman often has good connections behind her. Today, to import,
most of the women traders work with the sons of the President and the
customs officials are well aware of this; they would not take the risk of
getting into trouble by bothering a 'protected' illegal importer!"
Case Study #2
Fredinne The working poor
Fredinne is the poorest of the traders I met, but also the only one
who was in the marketplace every single day -including Sunday
mornings-. Fredinne sells Senegalese cloth for "The Senegalese", her
53
employer. The quality of the Senegalese printed cotton is rather poor and
the local consumption low; the import of this fabric is not restricted in
Zaire -the import restriction only affects the Wax-cloth.
Fredinne's family is originally from Bas-Zaire. They migrated in
Kinshasa in the 1950s where she was born. Fredinne does not speak
French, and I needed the help of other traders to talk to her; she was
nervous while talking to me, watching around in case her boss was in
the marketplace. She asked me to act as a customer. Fredinne is paid
2000 Zaires a month (about $15) but she does not complain much: other
employees (in the marketplace) are paid 3500 Zaires but they have pay
market tickets and transport cost, "the Senegalese" pays all this for
Fredinne: "the 2000 Zaires are all for me!" Sometimes her employer
comes to the marketplace at unexpected time, to inspect the work
Fredinne is doing. If "the Senegalese" is happy with Fredinne's work,
she might give her a gift (100 or 150 Zaires), but it seldom happens that
Fredinne sells more than 2 pieces of cloth a day, and the Senegalese is
usually not happy with these results. Fredinne used to sell cloth in her
shanty town district where her employer also lives. Fredinne would like
to work for herself but does not have the financial resources to do so...
actually she does not have any opportunity for accumulation. She cannot
afford participation in a Likelemba. She is 19 years old, was married but
recently divorced. Her divorce originated from difficulties with her
mother in law. She is now living with her parents again, with her 2
months old baby. Her father is a door keeper, her mother a field's
worker, she is the oldest of 10 children, and give all of her salary to her
parents.
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Case study #3
Mama Louzon's Team
I met Mama Louzon a couple of times in the marketplace; she
would not talk to me without a formal appointment finally set up in the
office of the wholesaler shop; she told me she needed to know more about
me before talking to me. Mama Louzon is an amazing person, with a
strong personality, and a great sense of humor. She laughs often but
takes her business affairs very seriously. She used to have 9 women
traders (including her 4 sisters) working for her in the marketplace,
selling the imported cloth she was importing herself; I believe Mama
Louzon was an strong and demanding manager. Since the cloth import
restrictions came into force, most of her employees have left the
marketplace; her younger sister is still working for her.
Mama Louzon used to be a secretary and an accountant but her
salary was very low; she thought she would be much better off selling
cloth in the marketplace. In 1978 a man invited her to go to Ivory Coast
for a week; the plane ticket and the hotel bill were paid by him, and with
her savings (3500 Zaires -1978 value- obtained through a Likelemba she
was involved in with her office mates) she bought a couple of pieces of
Wax-cloth. Back in Kinshasa, she did not pay any duty, as
accompanying her "friend" she was entitled to VIP treatment at the
airport. She sold the pieces of Wax-cloth in her office to other secretaries
who paid in 2 installments, and to her bosses' wives. She made a profit
of 7000 Zaires. "My monthly wage was about 1000 Zaires, I earned 7
monthly wages in a few weeks! I immediately understood I had to
resign!" She did so and specialized in the import of Wax-cloth. From her
initial stay in Abidjan she kept key contacts; she had places where to
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stay and knew were to find the cheapest merchandise. Back from her
second trip in Abidjan Mama Louzon took the boat: "it was less
expensive than the plane, and I knew the customs officials were less
severe in Matadi (the port) than at the airport; this time I had to pay the
customs duties as I was travelling alone!" The customs control
happened to be less stringent than she expected: "I was really afraid. At
that time I did know any of the customs officials, but I managed... First,
of course, I declared half of the quantity I actually had as they usually
don't count the number of cloths you have and if you declare all of them
you cannot make any profit! Then, I had a great idea which worked
well; I told them that the cloth I had was not "pure-Dutch-Wax-cloth"
but a Ivorian-Dutch mixture. Taxes on Ivorian goods are less expensive
than on Dutch goods, and I paid very little tax! I've been really lucky... I
am not sure the custom official believed me but I gave him a "gift" and
finally we both gained."
Mama Louzon found this activity extremely profitable. She
became a market wholesaler of imported cloth, garments, and shoes.
For 4 years she travelled to Abidjan, Brussels, Rome, Amsterdam; other
traders, usually co-participants in her Moziki, were giving her their
own savings in CFA Francs (that they obtained by changing Zairian
currency at the black market rate at "le Beach"). Mama Louzon was
buying pieces of Wax-cloth, garments, and shoes abroad where she had
numerous connections; she was sending them by boat to Kinshasa while
she travelled by air. The others traders would go to Matadi to get the
merchandise and to deal with the customs officials; this was the hardest
part of the job. "Once I had a really amazing experience, a woman
wanted me to give some money to one of her friends in Rome who would
56
send her clothes and shoes. As I did not know the woman -she was not
in our Moziki- I refused. She insisted and finally, when I left Kinshasa,
she was at the airport, right on the steps of the plane, begging me to take
her savings. I don't know how she got there, she must know someone at
the airport. Well, I took the money. There were 4 million Francs CFA
there (about $15 000) but I did not know this at that time, so I did not
declare this money on my arrival in Rome. At the Italian airport
another woman was waiting for me. She knew my name and what I
was wearing as the Zairian woman had give her a phone call in the
meantime. I gave her the money; to thank me, she offered to let me stay
in her place. She took me to the wholesalers, she also introduced me to a
Zairian friend, the wife of a diplomat, who could send anything she (we!)
wanted to Kinshasa. You see in this story, I took a risk; they took a risk
too as I could have stolen the money, but finally we all benefited from
this."
Mama Louzon had had some trading experiences when she was
young. Before being a secretary, she had a small restaurant, trade cloth
in her shanty town district, and had a taylor shop. Soon, she was also
involved in some real estate activity -buying, renting, selling same plots
with or without construction. "This is a very profitable activity, which
does not require too much time and which is not financially risky: land
and construction are always increasing in value in Zaire!"
She was born in Kassai; her father was a minister who became a
trader. She got married and divorced twice and each time she felt her
husband was interfering with her businesses life and did not let her
work as she wanted to. She finds it much more "profitable" to be a
single.
57
Appendix 3 The functioning of a Likelemba.
Nina, Rachelle, and lzha. Co-participants in a Likelemba
On a rainy day, Nina, Rachelle and Izha were taking shelter at a
cloth wholesale store, waiting for the end of the rain in order to rush
back to work. Nina is from Angola, Rachelle from Bas-Zaire, Izha's
family is also from Bas-Zaire, although she was born in Kinshasa. In
addition to being co-participants in the same Likelemba, Nina, Izha,
and Rachelle are very close friends (Nina and Rachelle are actually
sisters-in-law): "We are like sisters, there is not much difference
between the people of Angola and those from Bas-Zaire, we are very
similar. We are all from the same tribe. Other participants in the
Likelemba are not close friends of ours. Take Dominique for example,
she is honest, reliable and has good contacts: her sister -Mama Louzon-
is one of the most successful and powerful market cloth trader, as she
used to specialised in imported Wax-cloth. But they are from Kassai. We
can work with them, participate in the same Likelemba, but we cannot
get along together very well; these people from Kassai don't have the
same mentality. They say we are stingy, they don't like us, they are very
tribalist!"
Nina, Rachelle, and Izha have worked in the marketplace since
the beginning of the 1980s. All three of them were previously helping
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their mothers who are foodstuff traders in the marketplace. They are
proud to sell cloth rather than foodstuffs: "It is cleaner, more interesting
and much more prestigious!" They began by renting a table from a
friend or a relative. Izha has been fortunate, as her "landlord" had
grave financial difficulties a few months ago and decided to sell the
table. Nina and Rachelle are still paying a monthly rent of 200 Zaires.
Izha is now the wealthiest of the three traders, having 70 pieces of cloth -
including 18 CPA-Wax-cloth-, while her two friends have only 35 pieces
of cloth each.
While they sometimes buy their merchandise together and obtain
a little discount, they regret their inability to make larger collective
buying arrangements that would allow them significant discounts. But
previous bad experiences they either have had or have heard about, have
discouraged them from undertaking such associations. On the other
hand, the rotating credit association seems very successful. Twenty-five
cloth traders founded the credit association in June 1987, giving 1500
Zaires each, twice a month. After a year or so, when all of the co-
participants have benefited once, the Likelemba may cease or be
reorganized; the order of rotation may vary or the regular contribution
may increase. The "mother" of the association (who is herself a
participant, usually the oldest) is responsible for collecting the money
and distributing it to each of the contributors in rotation. It is through
the savings of the Likelemba that Izha was able to afford to buy her table,
and Nina a couple of pieces of Wax-cloth; Rachelle did not benefit yet she
also expects to buy Wax-cloth. Their business objective is generally to
have 40-50 pieces of cloth including at least 20 CPA-Wax-cloth. Beyond
this point, they feel their market activity is not worth expanding. Their
ultimate goal is to build their own houses, and thus ensure financial
independence from unreliable husbands.
Officially, none of these traders sell imported Wax-cloth, however
they confess that they would not miss an opportunity to get involved in a
Loterie Dare Dare. Their commission for participating in such an
activity, by hiding the cloth or introducing a customer, is about 1000
Zaires (approximately the profit they make in selling 10 pieces of locally
produced cloth). Their Likelemba also functions as useful network of
illegal trade intermediaries.
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